Inflation targeting and the sacrifice ratio by GONÇALVES, Carlos Eduardo S. & CARVALHO, Alexandre
177
Inflation Targeting and the Sacrifice Ratio∗
Carlos Eduardo S. Gonçalves†, Alexandre Carvalho‡
Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Literature; 3. Data andmethodology; 4. Results; 5. Final Remarks; A. Tables.
Keywords: Inflation Targeting; Sacrifice Ratio.
JEL Code: E42; E52.
Neste artigo mostramos que os países que adotaram o regime de Metas
de Inflação (IT) lograram desinflar suas economias com menores custso. O
efeito da dummy IT é estatística e economicamente bem significativo. Ao
reduzir significativamente os custos das desinflações, este sistema pode
tornar níveis mais baixos de inflação politicamente mais factíveis.
In this paper we show that economies that adopted the inflation targeting
(IT) regime have been able to “disinflate” less costly. The effect of IT on the sacri-
fice ratio is not only statistically significant, but also economically very impor-
tant. This result is all the more interesting given the lack of robust empirical
evidence in favor of IT. By significantly reducing the short-run costs of disin-
flation, IT may render the attainability of lower inflation levels politically more
feasible.
1. INTRODUCTION
Following in New Zealand’s footsteps, many countries (developed and developing alike) have opted
in the last sixteen years to implement formal inflation targeting regimes (IT) in order to attain – or lock
in – price stability. But in spite of its growing popularity among policy makers and academics, empirical
are not unanimous in corroborating its alleged benefits. In this paper, we present evidence in favor of
IT. Specifically, we show that inflation targeters experience lower disinflation costs.
Since long, the choice of an economy’s nominal “anchor” has been central in the debate about price
stability. Because the increase in money demand volatility in the 80’s rendered the targeting of mone-
tary aggregates unreliable, and the heightened capital flows in the 90’s brought hindered the strategy
of pegging the exchange rate in order to “import” inflation credibility, many countries currently use the
interest rate as their main monetary policy instrument. Within this latter group, some economies gave
one further step and adhered to a full-fledged IT regime in which inflation itself plays the role of the
economy’s nominal “anchor”.
In general, IT’s advocates claim the system has a greater ability to coordinate inflation expectations
than other monetary arrangements because of its announced commitment to a clear and verifiable
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target.1 If that is true, a simple expectations-augmented Phillips curve would suggest that countries
adopting this system should be able to attain lower inflation rates with smaller output losses. But not
only Bernanke et al. (1999) did not find evidence that developed economies who adopted the IT frame-
work experienced smaller output losses during disinflationary periods but, moreover, Ball and Sheridan
(2003) showed that whether a OECD economy inflation targets or not doesn’t seem to make any differ-
ence in terms of various other economic indicators such as average inflation, inflation volatility, interest
rate volatility or growth volatility.2
Here, we are concerned about the effects of IT on sacrifice ratios. Isolating episodes of disinflation
since the 90’s for a group of developing and developed economies, we show that the accumulated falls
in GDP (relative to its trend) during disinflationary periods are milder for those who had an inflation
target regime in place for at least six months.3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly revises the literature on the deter-
minants of the sacrifice ratio, Section 3 describes our data set and methodology, Section 4 presents our
main result and, finally, Section 5 briefly concludes.
2. LITERATURE
Empirical work has shown high inflation rates are detrimental to long run growth (Bruno and East-
erly, 1998) and entail non-negligible welfare costs (Lucas, 2000). But bringing inflation down is no
free-lunch either and is usually associated with non-trivial short run output losses (Ball, 1994). It is
therefore important to understand what determines the so-called “sacrifice ratio” (accumulated loss in
output during disinflations divided by the overall fall in inflation) and, in particular, to assess whether
it varies across different monetary regimes.
Following Ball (1994), empirical research on this topic has shown that the degree of nominal rigidity
and the velocity of the disinflationary process help to explain the variation in sacrifice ratios. Usually,
inflation at the beginning of the disinflationary period is employed as a proxy for nominal rigidity:
since nominal contracts tend to be shorter the higher the inflation rate, the initial level of inflation is
expected to be negatively correlated nominal rigidity and hence with the sacrifice ratio. On the other
hand, the velocity of the disinflationary process has in principle a dubious effect on the sacrifice ratio.
Whereas Sargent (1986) argues that rapid disinflations render them more credible and hence entail
smaller output losses, Taylor (1983) emphasizes that the presence of pervasive nominal rigidities makes
gradualism a less costly option.
Using velocity and some nominal rigidity index as basic regressors, subsequent studies have fo-
cused on the role of central bank independence. Given more independent central banks are supposedly
more shielded against politicians seeking short run political benefits from monetary policy, one would
expect more independent central banks to have a greater ability in anchoring private sector’s inflation
expectations. More independent central banks should therefore be capable of disinflating less costly.
Surprisingly, however, Posen (1995) and Debelle and Fischer (1995) – using different proxies for CB in-
dependence and different samples – both find that more independent central banks are associated with
higher sacrifice ratios.
1Credibility is also enhanced under IT because the system usually provides the central banker with appropriate incentives to
keep inflation under control.
2Gonçalves and Salles (2008) show, however, that applying Ball and Sheridan’s strategy of running difs-in-difs regressions to
a group of Emerging Economies yields opposite results. Targeters in this sample do seem to have performed better than
non-targeters.
3We find the restriction that a country is considered a targeter only if IT is in place for more than six months as highly plausible.
It is reasonable to expect that some time is needed for a new monetary policy modus operandi to build credibility. This same
argument is put forth by Bernanke et al. (1999).
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More related to our paper is Bernanke et al. (1999) finding of no credibility bonus coming from
the adoption of IT. They run a standard “Ball regression” and with the estimated coefficients in hands,
project what should have been the expected out-of-the-sample sacrifice ratios for targeting and non-
targeting countries in future actual disinflations. For three out of the four inflation targeters in their
sample, the actual sacrifice ratio in the first disinflation episode after adoption is greater than the
number projected using the coefficients of their estimated Ball’s regression (and the actual realization of
initial inflation and velocity). They thus go on to conclude that: “Disinflation under inflation targeting
– or at least the first disinflation under targeting – does not appear to be less costly than it would have
been absent inflation targeting”.
We see, however, two problems with this conclusion. First, it is necessary to stress that their
exercise says only that the first disinflation under the new regime was not less costly than expected.4
Secondly, the sample they study is very small: they use data from 9 developed economies and identify
only 25 disinflation episodes, which raises serious robustness doubts.
Here we dispute the claim that IT does not matter. Specifically, we show that those opting for it
have witnessed significantly smaller output losses during disinflations. This result has an important
policy implication: from a political economy perspective, since governments may shun from pursuing
a policy-induced disinflation by fear of the associate short run loss in output, the adoption of IT, by
attenuating the costs of disinflation, may render the attainability of lower levels of inflation politically
more palatable.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
From IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), we collect quarterly data on real GDP (level) and
consumer price inflation (CPI) for OECD and developing economies which experienced at least one
disinflation episode during the 1990/2006 period (see table 1). Data on central government debt comes
from the OECD database and from the World Bank.
We employ two methodologies to identify a disinflationary episode. First we use Ball’s methodology
(also employed by Posen (1995) and Bernanke et al. (1999)). Specifically, we construct a 9-quarter moving
average trend for inflation and consider declines from “peak” to “trough” greater than 2 percentage
points as disinflation episodes. Peaks are points where the moving average is bigger than both the
previous and subsequent four quarters and, likewise, troughs are points where the moving average
is smaller than both the previous and subsequent four quarters. As in Ball (1994), we discarded the
cases where initial inflation was above 20%. Finally, disinflationary processes are labelled as under
IT only if at the beginning of the disinflation IT was already in place for at least two quarters.5 As a
robustness check we experiment with another identification criterion in which any fall in quarterly CPI
inflation of at least 2 percentage points constitutes a disinflation.6 In this second criterion the end of
any disinflationary period is determined by the first quarter in which the process of inflation decline is
interrupted. For instance, a country displaying annualized inflation rates (in consecutive quarters) of
10%, 6%, 3%, 2% and 4% has one disinflationary episode (of 8 percentage points) lasting for 3 quarters.
Applying this criteria, we end up 54 episodes in the first case and 98 in the second (see tables 5 and 6).
We also experiment with two different measures of output cost when constructing the sacrifice
ratio index. Again, we first follow the traditional measure employed in Ball’s work and consider that
output is at potential when the disinflation begins and assume it is back to potential four quarters after
the end of the episode. The output cost is measured by accumulating the deviation of actual GDP (in
4Bernanke et al. (1999) claim the system is unlikely to yield concrete benefits shortly after its adoption. They argue it may take
some time before the private sector: (a) is fully aware of its features and, (b) deems it credible.
5Hereafter we will refer to this criterion as identification procedure 1.
6Identification procedure 2.
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logs) from the output trend (the line uniting GDP at the peak and GDP four quarters after the trough).
The sacrifice ratio index (sr) is simply this number divided by the total inflation decline. Our second
measure is the accumulated deviation of the log of the seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP from its HP
filter trend. To get to the sacrifice ratio we divide this number by the total inflation decline experienced.
Following the pattern in this literature, in this study we use the inflation rate (CPI) at the beginning
of the episode (proxy for nominal rigidity) and the inverse of the numbers of quarters in disinflation (a
velocity measure) as our basic controls.7 To these “Ball’s variables” we add an IT dummy equal to 1 if
the disinflation takes place in a targeting country, and 0 otherwise. The idea is that if after controlling
for velocity and initial inflation the dummy remains significant, we have an indication of a credibility
bonus associated with IT. We thus run the following basic regression using the two different criteria to
identify a disinflation and the two proposed measures of the sacrifice ratio:8
sr = c+ α.pi0 + β.
1
d
+ γ.IT +  (1)
where:
sr is the sacrifice ratio.
c is a constant.
pi0 is inflation at the beginning of the episode.
d is number of quarters under disinflation, and IT is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the country
inflation targets, and 0 otherwise.
Before presenting the formal econometric results we close this section with figures 1 and 2 which
show, respectively, that (i) the average sacrifice ratio – using Ball’s selection criterion and measure
of output loss – is much smaller in IT countries (approximately 1/3 of the average for non-inflation
targeters), and (ii) the usual controls in sacrifice ratio regressions do not differ much between the two
groups, hinting IT may have played an important role during disinflations.
4. RESULTS
In this section, we present our econometric evidence that IT matters. For all specifications tested,
we run four different models. Models 1 and 2 use the identification criterion that considers the raw
quarterly inflation data, whereas models 3 and 4 use the more widely employed Ball’s moving average
criterion. In models 1 and 4 the output cost is measured with a HP filter and in models 2 and 3 we again
resort to Ball’s methodology discussed in the previous section.
Before investigating the relevance of IT, we run a bare-bones specification including only initial
inflation and duration. The results are shown in table 1 below: initial inflation is highly significant
in all models. Velocity is borderline significant only in models 1 and 3. Model 3 – which we will see
is the best model for all regressions presented here (and the preferred specification in the literature)
– explains 23% of the variation in the sacrifice ratio. Judging by the point estimate of initial inflation
in this model, a country entering a disinflation with initial inflation ten percentage points higher than
another would experience, ceteris paribus, a sacrifice ratio approximately four percentage points smaller.
Hence, nominal rigidity does seem to matter greatly for the output cost of disinflations.
Now we add our IT dummy variable to the bare-bones specification above. The results are shown
in table 2 below. For the whole sample of countries, the IT dummy appears as statistically significant
in models 1 and 3. Model 3, again the best fit, explains 34% of the variation in data, an increase of
7As pointed out by a referee, it would be interesting to add as an additional regressor the degree of central bank independence.
Nevertheless, we could not find measures of central bank independence for most of emerging economies in our sample. And
even for the OECD economies, there is the difficulty of finding measures for different points in time. In the next section we
carried out another of his/her suggestions: to investigate the effect of a fiscal variable on the sacrifice ratio.
8This is our basic specification to which we’ll add also public debt and an interactive dummy variable as robustness checks.
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Figure 1: Sacrifice ratios – Ball’s criterion
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roughly 50% in relation to the baseline specification. Note the IT dummy is very precisely estimated
in this model and its economic relevance is of considerable size. All else equal, an inflation targeter
suffers much less – more than four percentage points in foregone output for each percentage point of
inflation decline – than a non-targeter. Finally, the other coefficients are little altered after including
the IT dummy in the models.
We are aware that this kind of cross-section regression is always subjected to a reverse causality
criticism. But we do not think this particular objection weakens our results here for a simple reason:
we find a negative partial correlation between IT and the sacrifice ratio. If it is true that countries
lacking credibility – and hence displaying greater sacrifice ratios – are precisely the ones adhering to
IT (this is the reverse causality argument), we should find a positive partial correlation between these
variables. Indeed, the fact that we find negative partial correlations means that the impact of IT on the
sacrifice ratio may actually be stronger than the ones we report.
Since our sample includes both developed and emerging economies, we can investigate whether
the IT dummy effect is due to the influence of a particular group of countries. For that, we add to our
regressors an interactive dummy equal to 1 if the country inflation targets and is an emerging economy,
and 0 otherwise.9 Table 3 presents the outcome of this regression for our four different models.
As shown, the pure IT dummy coefficient increases in size and is still better estimated than before.
Interestingly, the interactive dummy is of negative sign, meaning that the effect of IT on the costs of
disinflation is stronger for the sub-sample of developed economies. Since the pure IT dummy is greater
than the interactive dummy (and in model 3 they are both very precisely estimated), one still can argue
that IT helped emerging economies to disinflate less costly (but the gains seem to be more moderate
for this group of countries).
As a final robustness check we add the average central government debt during the disinflation-
ary periods.10 The rationale is that smaller indebtedness should lead to lower inflation expectations
independently of the monetary arrangement, and hence to smaller output costs. As table 4 shows, this
9This interactive dummy was suggested to us by an anonymous referee.
10As suggested by a referee, we tested if the size of the disinflation episode is a meaningful variable and find it isn’t. Results not
reported.
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Figure 2: Usual controlsInitial Inflatio (%)
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Table 1: Ball’s controls only
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
C -2,79 -2,00 -12,44 -2,58
(4.7) (2.55) (4.85) (4.6)
Initial Inflation 0,09 0,10 0,42 0,13
(3.57) (2.72) (3.24) (2.29)
Velocity 3,21 -1,79 39,20 -1,30
(1.86) (0.40) (1.93) (0.35)
Adj.R2 0,14 0,08 0,23 0,09
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance.
T-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 2: The IT dummy effect
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
C -3,15 -2,25 -13,30 -3,01
(4.72) (2.77) (5.25) (4.49)
Initial Inflation 0,11 0,11 0,44 0,15
(3.75) (2.46) (3.64) (2.38)
Velocity 3,06 -1,71 38,67 -2,04
(1.96) (0.39) (2.02) (0.48)
IT Dummy 0,66 0,41 4,85 0,91
(2.20) (0.90) (4.50) (1.23)
Adj.R2 0,20 0,09 0,34 0,11
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance.
T-statistics in parenthesis.
variable is however not statistically significant in any regression. Its inclusion renders the interactive
dummy statistically insignificant in our best preferred model 3, but other than that results are little
altered.
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Table 3: Adding the interactive dummy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
C -3,19 -2,35 -1,35 -3,07
(4.8) (2.93) (5.16) (4.50)
Initial Inflation 0,13 0,12 0,47 0,15
(3.98) (2.73) (3.70) (2.43)
Velocity 2,55 -1,84 37,87 -2,00
(1.61) (0.43) (1.94) (0.64)
IT Dummy 1,01 1,03 7,45 2,57
(2.63) (1.98) (6.02) (4.40)
IT Dummy*EM Dummy -0,69 -0,96 -3,45 -2,05
(1.85) (1.80) (3.57) (3.20)
Adj.R2 0,23 0,11 0,35 0,13
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance.
T-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 4: Adding a fiscal variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
C -2,97 -1,98 -10,27 -2,97
(4.1) (1.97) (3.51) (3.32)
Initial Inflation 0,12 0,13 0,12 0,18
(3.29) (2.60) (2.99) (2.50)
Velocity 2,76 -2,10 26,23 -2,42
(1.73) (0.47) (1.40) (0.55)
IT Dummy 0,97 0,98 6,60 2,51
(2.27) (1.80) (5.04) (3.45)
IT Dummy*EM Dummy -0,41 -1,16 -1,43 -1,95
(1.02) (1.96) (0.88) (3.35)
Dívida 0,00 -0,01 -0,04 -0,01
(0.40) (0.75) (1.19) (0.73)
Adj.R2 0,24 0,13 0,36 0,14
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance.
T-statistics in parenthesis.
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5. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper we took on the task of assessing if IT matters for reducing the costs of disinflation.
Our results suggest it does.
Judging by the coefficient of our most preferred specification, countries adopting IT save roughly
4 percentage points in GDP (level) relative to its trend for each point of inflation decline. This is an
economically important effect. Further, adding an emerging market interactive dummy to our model
reveals that the benefits from IT appear to be greater for developed economies. This finding, how-
ever, is not robust to the inclusion of a fiscal variable among the regressors and thus warrants further
investigation.
Wrapping up, by significantly reducing the short-run costs of disinflation IT may render the attain-
ability of lower inflation levels politically more feasible.
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A. TABLES
Table 5: Data
Country Episode SR-Ball SR-HP INFI DUR VAR Dummy Debt/ Dummy
GDP IT.EM
South Africa 1991:4 - 1993:1 -1,794 -1,507 16,107 6 6,711 0 40,24 0
South Africa 1994:1- 1994:2 - -1,000 9,67 2 2,516 0 49,72 0
South Africa 1997:1 - 1998:2 -0,523 - 9,61 6 4,489 0 48,84 0
South Africa 1998:4 - 1999:4 0,000 -0,696 9,08 5 7,124 0 45,27 0
South Africa 2001:1 -2001:4 -0,953 -0,229 7,42 4 3,116 1 45,12 1
South Africa 2002:4 - 2004:1 -0,556 -0,249 12,754 6 12,317 1 37,92 1
Argentina 1995:1 - 1996:2 -5,251 -4,576 4,837 6 5,053 0 - 0
Argentina 1998:2 - 1999:3 -2,440 - 1,165 6 2,956 0 - 0
Argentina 2003:2 - 2004:1 -0,023 -0,747 14,534 4 12,109 0 - 0
continue
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Table 5: Data (continuation)
Country Episode SR-Ball SR-HP INFI DUR VAR Dummy Debt/ Dummy
GDP IT.EM
Brazil 2003:2 - 2004:2 - -0,427 16,858 5 11,366 1 54,77 1
Brazil 2005:2 - 2006:1 -0,911 - 7,795 4 2,285 1 50,9 1
Chile 1994:1 - 1995:2 -0,832 -1,244 13,362 6 5,58 1 22,57 1
Chile 1997:4 - 1999:1 -5,644 - 6,291 6 2,471 1 13,28 1
Chile 2003:1 - 2004:1 -1,650 -1,758 3,777 5 3,771 1 15,72 1
Colombia 1998:3 - 1999:3 -1,742 -0,753 18,997 5 9,865 0 - 0
Colombia 2001:3 - 2002:2 -0,980 -2,684 8,03 4 2,119 1 - 1
Costa Rica 2001:2 - 2002:2 -1,230 -1,638 12,446 5 4,632 0 38,31 0
Ecuador 2002:1 - 2005:2 -0,785 - 14,709 14 13,216 0 - 0
Peru 1998:2 - 1999:3 - -0,964 8,108 6 5,324 1 - 1
Peru 2000:4 - 2002:1 -0,545 -2,977 4,001 6 5,011 1 - 1
Israel 1991:4 - 1993:2 -0,646 - 18,523 4 9,889 0 138,21 0
Israel 1994:4 - 1995:4 -4,900 -0,982 14,196 5 6,122 1 121,36 1
Israel 1996:2 - 1997:2 0,000 -0,592 12,316 5 3,684 1 110,85 1
Israel 1997:3 - 1998:3 - -0,544 9,06 5 5,442 1 108,55 1
Israel 2002:4 - 2004:1 -1,051 -1,318 6,708 6 9,193 1 98,12 1
India 1997:1 - 1997:3 -1,308 -0,722 10,632 3 5,563 0 51,12 0
India 2000:2 - 2001:2 - -0,617 5,263 5 2,536 0 57,87 0
Indonesia 1999:3 - 2000:1 -0,564 -1,274 6,586 3 7,159 0 45,21 0
Indonesia 2002:1 - 2004:1 -0,092 - 14,541 9 9,659 0 29,98 0
Malaysia 1992:3 - 1993:4 -0,549 - 5,189 6 2,544 0 60,03 0
Malaysia 1998:2 - 2000:2 - -5,990 5,728 9 4,315 0 36,84 0
Phillippines 1991:3 - 1993:2 -0,866 -0,701 19,783 8 13,579 0 43,7 0
Phillippines 1994:2 - 1995:1 -1,130 -0,818 9,442 4 3,198 0 56,41 0
Phillippines 1998:4 - 2000:1 - -0,513 10,55 6 12,015 0 - 0
Phillippines 2001:1 - 2002:4 -0,590 -0,342 7,491 8 4,995 0 66,17 0
Singapore 1997:4 - 1998:3 -4,152 -1,259 2,295 5 3,751 0 80,67 0
Singapore 2001:2 - 2002:1 - -1,513 1,691 4 2,538 0 93,72 0
Thailand 1998:2 - 1999:3 - -2,638 10,363 6 11,291 0 17,97 0
Thailand 2001:2 - 2002:2 -2,200 -2,894 2,5 5 2,266 1 28,82 1
Morocco 1992:1 - 1992:2 -2,085 -0,433 8,341 3 4,441 0 83,66 0
Morocco 1995:2 - 1996:3 - -3,066 6,783 6 4,788 0 80,71 0
Morocco 1996:4 - 1997:2 -9,863 - 3,158 3 3,181 0 75,52 0
Tunisia 2002:1 - 2003:1 -2,671 -3,056 3,776 5 2,467 0 61 0
Tunisia 2004:1 - 2005:2 -0,862 - 4,887 5 3,483 0 59,82 0
Korea 1991:4 - 1993:1 -2,127 -0,636 9,054 6 4,429 0 11,85 0
Korea 1998:1 - 1999:2 -1,264 -3,634 8,934 6 8,339 0 15,85 0
Czech Republic 1998:1 - 1999:3 -0,851 -0,872 13,31 7 12,109 0 10,54 0
Czech Republic 2001:3 - 2003:1 -0,963 -0,788 5,38 7 5,737 1 16,86 1
Hungary 1997:4 - 1999:2 -0,385 -0,407 18,14 7 8,987 0 61,02 0
Hungary 2001:2 - 2002:3 -0,409 - 10,549 6 5,979 0 53,01 0
Hungary 2004:2 - 2005:1 - -0,069 7,372 4 3,817 1 57,64 1
Poland 1996:4 - 1997:4 - -0,092 18,835 5 5,368 0 43,47 0
Poland 1998:1 - 1999:1 -0,497 - 13,802 5 7,631 0 39,59 0
Poland 2000:3 - 2003:1 -2,296 -0,709 10,797 11 10,456 1 39,46 1
Poland 2004:3 - 2006:1 -1,191 - 4,658 7 3,991 1 44,32 1
United States 1990:4 - 1992:1 -1,63 -1,39 6,224 6 3,355 0 45,07 0
United States 2000:3 - 2002:1 -0,62 - 3,508 7 2,256 0 33,71 0
United Kingdom 1990:3 - 1992:1 -1,51 -0,14 10,434 7 6,332 0 32,98 0
United Kingdom 1992:2 - 1993:2 -1,64 -2,74 4,168 5 2,898 0 36,13 0
United Kingdom 1998:2 - 1999:3 0,00 -0,16 3,994 6 2,833 1 47,94 0
United Kingdom 2000:3 - 2001:4 -0,21 - 3,2 6 2,154 1 41,61 0
Germany 1992:2 - 1992:4 -0,89 - 6,129 3 2,752 0 20,5 0
Germany 1993:3 - 1996:1 - -1,31 4,51 11 3,085 0 21,52 0
Italy 1995:3 - 1997:3 -0,95 - 5,685 9 3,863 0 112,54 0
Netherlands 2001:2 - 2003:2 -2,66 - 4,738 9 2,725 0 41,92 0
Norway 2003:1 - 2004:1 - -0,68 4,543 5 5,943 1 20,11 0
Sweden 1991:1 - 1992:2 -0,09 - 11,283 6 9,125 0 51,13 0
Sweden 1993:2 - 1994:1 -0,80 -2,47 4,956 4 3,319 1 70,66 0
Sweden 1995:2 - 1996:4 -1,97 - 2,75 7 2,997 1 77,97 0
Sweden 1997:4 - 1998:4 -1,78 -0,80 1,563 5 2,666 1 74,22 0
Sweden 2003:1 - 2004:1 - -1,46 2,985 5 2,932 1 48,81 0
Switzerland 1991:2 - 1992:4 -0,57 0,00 6,253 7 2,811 0 14,5 0
Canada 1991:1 - 1992:3 -0,83 -1,46 6,434 7 5,199 0 52,06 0
Canada 2001:2 - 2001:4 -0,73 0,00 3,598 3 2,495 1 39,71 0
Canada 2003:1 - 2004:1 -1,04 -1,04 4,475 5 3,602 1 33,94 0
Japan 1997:3 - 1998:3 -1,11 - 2,214 5 2,408 0 52,06 0
Finland 1990:3 - 1992:3 -6,38 - 5,925 9 3,44 0 20,2 0
Finland 1993:1 - 1994:1 -3,81 -6,64 2,592 5 2,303 0 54,81 0
Iceland 2002:1 - 2003:1 -2,21 -1,10 9,028 5 7,481 1 34,94 0
Ireland 2003:1 - 2004:1 - -0,39 4,939 5 3,328 0 26,25 0
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Table 5: Data (continuation)
Country Episode SR-Ball SR-HP INFI DUR VAR Dummy Debt/ Dummy
GDP IT.EM
Spain 1992:1 - 1993:1 -4,92 - 6,553 5 2,32 0 43,53 0
Spain 1996:3 - 1997:2 - -0,30 3,667 4 2,094 1 55,38 0
Australia 1990:1 - 1990:3 0,00 - 8,576 3 2,496 0 6,28 0
Australia 1990:4 - 1991:4 -2,17 -0,57 6,846 5 5,337 0 7,12 0
Australia 1995:3 - 1997:3 -0,81 -0,07 5,094 9 5,427 1 19,24 0
New Zealand 2001:2 - 2001:3 - -0,46 6,022 2 3,501 1 30,39 0
New Zealand 1990:2 - 1992:1 -1,59 - 7,625 8 6,831 0 64,64 0
New Zealand 1995:2 - 1996:2 -2,04 - 4,59 5 2,605 1 46,17 0
New Zealand 1998:2 - 1999:3 - -2,77 1,722 6 2,218 1 36,95 0
Slovak Republic 1994:1 - 1996:3 -0,32 - 15,455 11 10,095 0 19,67 0
Slovak Republic 2000:2 - 2001:1 -0,71 -0,41 15,795 4 8,781 0 30,2 0
Slovak Republic 2001:3 - 2002:3 - -0,61 7,925 5 5,412 0 35,87 0
Slovak Republic 2003:4 - 2005:3 -0,05 - 9,531 8 7,441 0 36,43 0
Portugal 1992:2 - 1993:2 -2,23 - 9,597 5 3,78 0 55,06 0
Portugal 1993:4 - 1999:4 -0,09 -2,20 6,467 5 2,305 0 58,48 0
Portugal 1995:1 - 1996:1 - -1,16 4,621 5 2,188 0 61,59 0
Portugal 1996:3 - 1997:3 - -2,84 3,614 5 2,041 0 59,65 0
Average -1,543 -1,340 7,938 5,742 5,197 48,120
Std. Deviation 1,682 1,326 4,551 1,996 3,068 0,480 26,255
Table 6: Data
Country Episode SR-Ball SR-HP INFI DUR VAR Dummy Debt/ Dummy
GDP IT.EM
Argentina 1993:1 - 1997:1 -1,10 -0,73 17,09 17 16,72 0 - 0
Argentina 2003:1 - 2004:3 - -1,27 18,37 7 12,44 0 - 0
Brazil 2002:4 - 2005:1 -2,00 -0,70 11,15 11 4,54 1 52,83 1
Colombia 1999:1 - 2005:1 -9,07 -2,36 14,18 25 8,84 0 58,22 0
Czech Republic 1998:1 - 2000:1 -2,89 -2,14 8,85 9 5,71 0 11,52 0
Czech Republic 2001:1 - 2003:2 -3,53 -1,61 4,25 10 3,26 1 16,87 1
Ecuador 2002:2 - 2005:1 -0,80 - 17,84 14 15,11 0 - 0
Indonesia 2000:1 - 2000:3 - -0,70 13,28 3 6,99 0 45,21 0
Indonesia 2001:4 - 2004:2 -0,11 - 11,39 11 4,83 0 29,98 0
Israel 1990:3 - 1991:4 - -1,33 18,59 6 2,74 0 148,68 0
Israel 1994:1 - 2000:4 -0,29 - 11,79 28 10,58 1 110,05 1
Israel 2002:2 - 2004:2 -5,25 -4,07 3,72 9 4,04 1 98,12 1
Korea 1991:2 - 1993:2 -0,07 -0,77 8,81 9 3,37 0 11,86 0
Korea 1998:1 - 2000:1 -12,06 -8,35 5,40 9 3,63 0 16,38 0
Malaysia 1998:1 - 2001:1 -3,58 -9,13 3,97 13 2,50 0 36,84 0
Mexico 1992:1 - 1993:4 -1,59 - 18,28 9 9,37 0 26,59 0
Mexico 1999:1 - 2005:1 -0,69 - 15,64 25 11,38 0 23,54 0
Mexico 1997:4 - 1998:4 -2,65 - 19,44 5 3,05 0 26,77 0
Morocco 1991:1 - 1993:3 -4,71 - 7,55 11 2,57 0 81,07 0
Morocco 1994:3 - 2004:4 -6,65 -0,92 5,84 26 4,62 0 76,45 0
Peru 1995:1 -2002:3 -1,30 - 17,02 31 15,95 1 - 1
Phillippines 1990:4 - 1992:4 -4,56 -1,77 15,37 15 7,93 0 51,25 0
Phillippines 1998:3 - 2001:1 - -1,68 8,24 11 4,91 0 - 0
Poland 1999:1 - 2003:2 - -0,25 9,60 18 8,22 0 39,51 0
South Africa 1993:1 - 1997:2 -5,14 -0,83 14,95 24 7,40 0 48,30 0
South Africa 1997:4 - 2000:4 -3,31 -1,40 7,90 12 2,87 0 45,27 0
South Africa 2002:2 - 2004:4 -0,92 -0,43 7,84 11 5,63 1 37,92 1
Thailand 1997:3 - 2000:2 -10,65 -5,18 6,63 12 5,64 0 16,17 0
United States 1990:2 - 1994:4 -11,16 -0,98 5,13 19,00 2,42 0 46,72 0
United Kingdom 1990:1 - 1992:4 -5,39 -0,09 8,64 12,00 5,82 0 32,98 0
Austria 1993:1 - 1998:4 -5,92 -3,09 3,75 24,00 2,98 0 55,63 0
Belgium 1990:3 - 1998:4 -21,18 -2,72 3,43 34,00 2,37 0 111,38 0
Germany 1991:3 - 1996:2 - -1,90 4,57 14,00 3,03 0 20,85 0
Italy 1990:2 - 1994:1 -16,65 -2,53 6,43 16,00 2,19 0 102,76 0
Italy 1995:1 - 1998:3 -2,38 - 4,69 15,00 2,88 0 111,59 0
Netherlands 2001:4 - 2005:1 -5,55 - 3,88 14,00 2,46 0 42,50 0
Norway 1990:1 - 1993:4 -10,37 -1,31 4,28 16,00 2,40 0 27,24 0
Sweden 1990:4 - 1992:4 -5,62 - 9,53 9,00 5,49 0 47,43 0
Sweden 1993:1 - 1997:4 -19,59 -2,85 3,35 20,00 3,20 0 74,48 0
Switzerland 1991:1 - 1998:2 -6,64 -1,29 5,53 30,00 5,28 0 21,17 0
Canada 1991:1 - 1994:1 -11,30 -3,56 4,80 13,00 3,73 0 54,19 0
Japan 1990:4 - 1995:3 -2,39 - 3,11 20,00 3,07 0 54,60 0
Finland 2001:1 - 2004:2 -6,20 -2,50 2,86 14,00 2,36 0 43,49 0
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Table 6: Data (continuation)
Country Episode SR-Ball SR-HP INFI DUR VAR Dummy Debt/ Dummy
GDP IT.EM
Finland 1990:1 - 1993:2 -16,67 -0,18 6,21 14,00 4,33 0 27,98 0
Iceland 2001:2 - 2003:3 -8,25 -2,39 6,16 10,00 3,80 0 36,49 0
Ireland 2001:2 - 2004:4 -0,37 -0,77 5,21 15,00 2,92 0 27,82 0
Spain 1994:4 - 1998:2 -16,89 -1,00 4,71 15,00 2,84 0 53,25 0
Australia 1990:1 - 1993:1 -6,57 -0,39 7,14 13,00 5,74 0 9,20 0
Australia 1995:3 - 1998:2 -1,18 -0,11 3,55 12,00 2,94 1 18,43 0
New Zealand 1990:1 - 1992:4 -8,44 -1,12 5,76 12,00 4,63 0 60,43 0
New Zealand 1995:4 - 1998:4 -1,82 - 3,00 13,00 2,40 1 40,76 0
Slovak Republic 2000:3 - 2002:1 -0,77 -1,35 11,07 7,00 5,48 0 31,92 0
Slovak Republic 2003:4 - 2005:1 -0,16 -0,41 7,50 6,00 2,46 0 36,43 0
Portugal 1990:1 - 1999:1 -7,30 -1,33 12,95 37,00 10,52 0 56,91 0
Average -5,87 -1,89 8,71 15,09 5,42 48,08
Std. Deviation 5,43 1,93 5,00 7,53 3,63 30,41
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